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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)G). Pursuant to Utah R.
App. P. 42( a), this case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment

when the pleadings and submissions before it revealed significant issues of
material fact, which the court then improperly weighed in ruling for the
Defendants.
Standard of Review: In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, no

deference is given to the lower court's ruling. The Court will evaluate all
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment. See

Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 975 P.2d 464, 464-65 (Utah 1998);
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power & Water, 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah
1990).
Preservation of Issue: The lower court could only grant summary judgment

if it was proper to do so, i.e. if the evidence before it revealed no issues of
material fact. The record considered by the lower court contained numerous
issues of material fact. These issues were preserved in the parties'

submissions to the lower court including the Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto (R. 301496); the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time to
Respond to Summary Judgment (R. 504-06), the Affidavit of Michael S.
Robinson Regarding Service of Summary Judgment Motion (R. 502-03), the
Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding Service of
Summary Judgment Motion (R. 509-10), the Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
Summary Judgment (R. 511-545), the Response Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment (R. 546-

-,
i

5 51 ), the Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding
Extension to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion (R. 552-62), the
Affidavit of Chase Kimball (R. 563-69), the Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply and exhibits thereto (R.
580-596), the Motion in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File SurSur Response and exhibits thereto (R. 697-716).
Issue No. 2: Whether the lower court abused its discretion in failing to
grant Appellant's new counsel a continuance to take additional discovery,
designate an expert witness, and respond to Defendants' motion for
summary judgment when there was no showing that Robinson had been

2

dilatory in seeking new counsel, both Robinson and his new counsel sought
reasonable extensions of time from opposing counsel which requests were
rejected, no prejudice would have occurred to the Defendants as their

'11

dispositive motion was filed several months prior to the scheduling order
date for doing so, and no trial date had been set in the case.
Standard of Review: The decision to grant a continuance, to grant
additional time or to allow additional discovery to take place are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See e.g. Energy Mgt. Servs., L.L. C. v. Shaw, 2005
UT App 90, ,rs, 110 P.3d 158.
Preservation of Issue: These issues were preserved in Motion for
Extension of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment (R. 507-08), the
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
Summary Judgment (R. 504-06), the Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson
Regarding Service of Summary Judgment Motion (R. 502-03), the
Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding Service of
Summary Judgment Motion (R. 509-10), the Response Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment
(R. 546-551 ), the Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding
Extension to Respond to Su~mary Judgment Motion (R. 552-62), the
Affidavit of Chase Kimball (R. 563-69), and the Motion in Support of

3

.,/

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Sur-Sur Response and exhibits thereto
(R. 697-716).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 provides in relevant part:
(b) For defending party. - A party against whom a claim ... is
asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to
all or any part thereof.
( c) Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion, memoranda
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law ....
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. - Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(6) provides:
(b) Enlargement. - When by these rules or ... by order of the
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion ... (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect ....

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case:
This is a legal malpractice action brought by Appellant Michael S.
Robinson ("Robinson") against his former counsel Jones Waldo Holbrook &
McDonough and its then-employees, Stephen W. Clark ("Clark") and
Melissa M. Bean ("Bean") (collectively "Defendants") in connection with
their representation of him in a divorce proceeding against his former wife
Debra Robinson ("Ms. Robinson").
Briefly stated, upon Bean's advice, Robinson entered into a
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement ("Stipulation") which
allocated millions of dollars of pre-marital and marital assets that were to be
divided upon Robinson refinancing their primary asset, the Phoenix Plaza in
St. George, Utah (the "Plaza"). The belief that the Plaza could be refinanced
was based upon representations that Ms. Robinson made regarding the rental
income and the state of the leases with tenants at the Plaza. Unknown at the
time of entering into the Stipulation, Robinson could not refinance the Plaza
because there were insufficient long-term leases acceptable to the lenders.
The Defendants' malpractice includes their appointing an
inexperienced associate (Bean) to attend the mediation and settlement of a
multi-million dollar marital and financial dissolution; failure to properly

5

advise Robinson during the course of the mediation leading up to the
execution of the Stipulation; and failing to include protective provisions for
him. Defendant Clark, the senior partner on the matter, had specifically
instructed Bean to make sure that the Stipulation could be rescinded if the
Plaza could not be refinanced for reasons beyond Robinson's control. He
also warned her to include provisions regarding the accuracy of
representations made.
As a result of his inability to refinance the Plaza and the lower court's
decision to enforce the Stipulation, adopt its provisions verbatim into the
Divorce Decree, and then holding Robinson in contempt for failing to
refinance the Plaza, Robinson has lost now lost millions of dollars of his premarital assets and all of his interests in the marital property. All these
damages would have been avoided had Clark been at the mediation and/or if
Bean had followed the instruction of her senior partner as to how Robinson
should be protected.

B. Course of Proceedings:
Robinson, acting prose, filed the Complaint in this action (R 1-34)
on October 31, 2011. He did so in order to assert his claims within the
applicable statute of limitations. He was forced to file pro se because after
the loss of millions of dollars of pre-marital assets, his share of marital

6

assets, and his primary sources of income in the divorce proceeding he
simply could not afford to hire counsel other than on a contingent fee basis.
After the filing of the Complaint, Robinson was able to retain Scott T.
Evans, Eric K. Jenkins and the firm Christensen & Jensen, PC. They made
their first formal appearance in the case at least by March 21, 2012, after the
Defendants had moved to dismiss the Complaint for untimely service. (R.
35-57).
Ultimately, the Defendants filed their Answer on July 23, 2012 (R.
164-76) and then filed an Amended Answer on February 12, 2013 (R. 193206).
On December 28, 2012, the parties entered into a Rule 26 Stipulated
Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order (R. 177-180 ). The Scheduling Order
provided that initial disclosures were to be made by January 4, 2013; fact
discovery was to be completed less than six.months later -- June 8, 2013;
Robinson's expert(s) was/were to be designated by July 26, 2013, and expert
discovery was to be completed by October 30, 2013. All dispositive motions
were to be filed by November 15, 2013. No trial date was set.
As required by the Scheduling Order, the parties exchanged their
initial disclosures on January 4, 2013, and Robinson provided a
supplemental disclosure (see R. 181-83, 224). From January 4 through

7

March 29, 2013, the parties exchanged interrogatories, document requests,
and requests for admissions (see R. 184-85, 242-44, 252, 253,257, 258265). The parties responded to written discovery (see R. 223, 245, 246, 267,
276). Thus, once the Defendants' Answer was filed, the case was pursued
diligently.
On April 8, 2013, Robinson's counsel unexpectedly withdrew (see R.
268-69). Immediately, Defendants served Robinson with their Notice to
Appoint New Counsel or Appear (R. 270-72). Robinson diligently sought
new counsel, but found it extraordinarily difficult given the extensive history
of the underlying divorce case in which the Defendants' malpractice had
occurred; the fact that the Defendants were associated with Jones Waldo,
one of the state's largest and best-known law firm and Ms. Bean had
transferred to another large and well-known firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer;
and Robinson did not want to "shop" the case, instead, giving several
potential counsel an opportunity to review the case before deciding whether
to accept representation. The challenge to Robinson was increased due to his
need to have any new counsel take the case on a contingent fee basis, which
obviously increased the amount of time counsel would spend evaluating the
case.

8

This was first explained in the Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson
Regarding Service of Summary Judgment Motion (R. 502-03), wherein

"

Robinson testified:
7. I have been communicating with Mr. Kimball for a
few weeks about taking over this case, and he agreed to review
the long histories of the instant case and my related divorce
action.
8. I met with Mr. Kimball and Mr. Lewis to arrange
limited representation on August 1ih.
9. Because of the complexities of this case, it has taken
me months of diligent searching to obtain representation, and
even then only limited representation was available to me.
In the Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding
Summary Judgment Motion (R. 552-62), Robinson provided much more
detail as to his excruciating efforts to secure counsel:
2. Previous counsel, after completing most of the
documentary discovery withdrew at a very critical time, leaving
me virtually helpless in dealing with the case. I am 66 years old
and after losing all his premarital assets in a divorce which he
was represented by Jones Waldo, I have not had money for my
ongoing living, lifestyle, and legal expenses.
3. A contingent fee basis is my only option for
representation in the malpractice case. I have been diligently
seeking counsel in this case.
4. I talked with Mr. Call [counsel for Defendants] soon
after Scott Evans withdrew and asked him to have the courtesy
to extend the times for discovery, etc. while attempting to retain
counsel. This was well before the deadlines had expired. Mr.
Call indicated that he would not oppose extensions in the case,
but that his client would probably resist such accommodations.
5. I met with a number of attorneys, and contacted four
out-of-state firms as well. Of approximately 20 attorneys
contacted, most communicated that there were conflicts of
9
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interest, including the typical ones, but also including ones
stating that he used to work for the firm Defendant Bean now
works for [Parsons, Behle & Latimer], and they had many
friends at that firm. Plaintiff has discovered that almost every
attorney in the Salt Lake market has some ties with Jones
Waldo or actual conflicts of interest ....
6. It is not surprising that a Wyoming firm, Texas firm,
Arizona firm, a California firm, and as many as two dozen Utah
lawyers were contacted and decline to take the case. Countless
hours were spent trying to engage counsel. The process of
finding counsel was delayed by some attorneys taking over a
month before making a decision. Mr. Kimball himself [who
ultimately entered a limited appearance on Robinson's behalfJ
reviewed the circumstances with me for several weeks before
agreeing to a limited appearance on a contingency ....
9. Because I was spending my time in the difficult task of
finding a new attorney, and because of my obvious
unfamiliarity with civil procedure, I was unable to complete
discovery and especially to depose Bean during the period
allotted in the scheduling order. I apologize to the court for this
but it was unavoidable given my desperate situation. I did not
attend the Debra Robinson deposition because I was
intimidated by the process ... but managed to convince my
divorce counsel Mr. Call to attend .... Ifl can depose Bean I can
ask her to explain the attached emails, and I anticipate her
responses will give me the information to better oppose a
summary judgment motion. I also want to ask Clark ifhe feels
that Bean adequately followed his advice to protect my
interests. I don't know exactly how long this would take
because the parties would have to consult their respective
calendars, but I am assured that my counsel will move the
matter along with all deliberate speed, and that with
cooperation another two months would likely be sufficient.
10. Because I am not an attorney, and because this
process has been so long and complicated and intimidating, I
did not engage much with Mr. Call regarding the case but
instead put my efforts into acquiring new counsel, which I
thought would be more helpful. As noted in detail above, this
was a protracted and exhausting process. I was absolutely not
dilatory in this matter.
10

While Robinson was still unrepresented and more than three and onehalf months before the dispositive motion deadline, the Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment on July 29, 2013. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
7(c)(l) and 6, Robinson's response to the motion for summary judgment was
due August 15, 2013.
On August 12, 2013, Robinson was finally able to retain James C.
Lewis and Chase Kimball of the firm Lewis Hansen on a limited basis. Mr.
Kimball began working on the case on August 15, 2013 and discovered that
a response to the motion for summary judgment was due on that same day.

See Affidavit of Chase Kimball (R. 563-69), if3. Robinson's new counsel
immediately contacted opposing counsel and sought a short extension of
time in which to respond to the motion for summary judgment, by
reasonably suggesting that the time for a response should not begin to run
until the court had ruled on Defendants' motion to file an overlength
memorandum. Id at 'lf5. Defendants' counsel failed to respond to that
reasonable request (likely in violation of the Rules of Professional Civility).
Accordingly, on August 16, 2013, Robinson's counsel filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment, a supporting
memorandum, and an affidavit from Robinson. (R. 504-506, 507-508, and
509-10). They were hastily drafted submissions given new counsel's
11

unfamiliarity with the case, the Defendants' unresponsiveness to the
reasonable request for an extension of time, and the need to present the issue
as quickly as possible to the court.
The Defendants' opposed the motion (R. 511-545).
On September 4, 2013, Robinson retained Mr. Orson West, Esq. as his
expert in this matter. See R. 564, ,6.
On September 9, 2013, Robinson supplied a supplemental affidavit in
support of his motion for extension of time (R. 552-62), as well as a
declaration from his counsel, Chase Kimball (R. 563-69). Mr. Kimball
confirmed that he was only seeking a two-month extension in which to take
and complete discovery. (R. 564, ,8).
On September 25, 2013, the Defendants moved for leave to file a surreply, which contained the proposed supporting memorandum. (R. 580-696).
Exhibit 7 included emails between Robinson and the Defendants (R. 65081 ). No other submission by Defendants with respect to their summary
judgment motion contained any emails, yet as shown below, the lower court
clearly relied upon these emails in making in rulings.
On February 12, 2014, the Hon. Charlene Barlow, issued her Ruling
on Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion for Summary
Judgment and on Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 724-28). A copy of the
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Ruling is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Appendix. Therein, the court
concluded that:
2. Plaintiff was required to follow the discovery plan and
scheduling order and designate expert witnesses by July 26,
2013.
3. Plaintiff's original counsel withdrew in April and he
had over three months to retain new counsel and either comply
with the discovery plan and scheduling order or to seek to
amend the plan.
4. Plaintiff missed the deadline to designate any expert
witnesss, he missed all subsequent deadlines and cut off dates
[the only one of which was the completion of expert discovery
as Robinson had no dispositive motions to file]. (R. 726).
In granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
stated:
"[T]he Court finds that plaintiff has not filed any affidavits or
other evidence which raise an issue of disputed material fact to
survive a motion for summary judgment. Without an expert
witness, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that defendants'
representation of him in his divorce action fell below the
applicable standard of care. Additionally, the affidavits, emails,
and other evidence presented by defendants in support of their
motion demonstrate that plaintiff cannot show that any alleged
breach by defendants caused any loss to him .... The emails
between plaintiff and defendants demonstrate that they tried
to come up with theories through which he could be relieved
of his responsibili'ty to refinance but told him the chances
were 50/50 at best. Defendants' emails to plaintiff continually
reminded him of his obligation to refinance the Plaza within
15 days hut also show that he continually put off that
obligation hoping to get a better interest rate and hoping to
not have to pay the applicationfee for refinancing. Based
upon his failure to even attempt to comply with the stipulation,
this Court and other courts have ruled against him in other case.
Plaintiff cannot show that any actions by defendants have
13

caused the financial losses he is facing. As other courts have
held, his failure to even attempt to comply with the stipulation
have been the cause of his losses. (R. 726-27).
A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on March 5, 2014. (R. 744).

C. Disposition in the Court Below:
After unreasonably refusing to allow Robinson's new counsel a
reasonable period of time to become familiar with the case and to take
discovery in order to better oppose the Defendants' summary judgment
motion, and despite the issues of material fact revealed in the Defendants'
submissions to the lower court, Defendants' motion for summary judgment
was granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. In February 2007, Robinson retained Jones Waldo to represent him

in his divorce action against Ms. Robinson. Clark was lead counsel on the
case and Bean was assigned as the junior associate. See Complaint (R. 1-14)
at ,11 and response thereto in Amended Answer (R. 193-206);
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 1Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. 301-496) at (R. 309).
2. On or about November 2, 2007, Robinson and his counsel Bean,

1

Throughout this brief, any text in bold italics has been placed for emphasis.
14

and Ms. Robinson and her counsel Mr. Dean Andreasen, attended a day-long
mediation. See Complaint (R. 1-14) at ,,23, 36 and responses thereto in
Amended Answer (R. 193-206); Memorandum in Support of Defendants'

.,.

Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 301-496) at (R. 310).
3. Several days prior to the mediation, Ms. Robinson provided
Robinson with a "Handwritten Analysis" purporting to describe the annual
rents at the parties' most significant asset, the Phoenix Plaza located in St.
George, Utah (the "Plaza"). Ms. Robinson represented that the current
monthly income including administration fee was "$14,500 + $1,257 and
that the Plaza was 95% occupied, and that using a 7% capitalization rate, the
Plaza had a value of $7.5 million. See Complaint (R. 1-14) at 116 and

..
responses thereto in Amended Answer (R. 193-206).
4. On November 1, 2007, the day before the mediation, Andreasen
sent a draft of a proposed stipulation to Bean. See Complaint (R. 1-14) at
,r19 and responses thereto in Amended Answer (R. 193-206)
5. Bean forwarded the proposed stipulation to Clark that evening
asking for his comments. Even with spending only a little time with the
stipulation, Clark wrote Bean expressing several significant concerns:

There probably ought to be some protections in the event
[Robinson/ is unable, notwithstanding his 'best efforts' to
refinance the Phoenix Plaza ....

15

I notice there is a disclosure provision, but it's not really
apposite or thorough ....
Looks good otherwise I guess, can't tell whether it's a good
deal/or him or not, but do your best to protect him against
bad things that could happen down the road, like an
unforeseen inability to refinance.

See Complaint (R. 1-34) at if22 and response thereto in Amended Answer
(R. 193-206); Exhibit B to Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson
Regarding Extension to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion, at R. 56162, and see quoted reference to this email contained in Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply at (R. 588-89).
A copy of this email is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Appendix.
6. The mediation took place on November 2, 2007 at which Robinson
.,

and Ms. Robinson signed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
("Stipulation"). A copy of the Stipulation is attached as Exhibit 3 to the
Appendix.
7. A review of the Stipulation reveals that Robinson and Ms.
Robinson had settled on a division of their assets that designated as separate
property the amounts each contributed to the property holdings and other
assets (e.g. down payments, earnest money payments, mortgage pay downs,
and 1031 exchanges). Once those amounts were allocated, then Robinson
and Ms. Robinson were to divide the remaining equities in the properties on
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a 50/50 basis. See Complaint (R. 1-14) at ,i,r20, 21 and responses thereto in
Amended Answer (R. 193-206).
8. After the allocation of the assets, Robinson was required to pay
Ms. Robinson approximately $1.8-1.9 million. See Complaint (R. 1-14) at
,I21 and responses thereto in Amended Answer (R. 193-206).
9. Outside of Robinson's premarital home and profit-sharing plan, the
transfer of property interests in the other properties were all specifically
made contingent upon Robinson refinancing the Phoenix Plaza by obtaining
a $3.5 million loan, $1.9 million which would be paid to Ms. Robinson2 and
the remainder to pay off the existing $1.6 million mortgage on the Plaza.
10. The key provisions of the Stipulation provided:
The disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix Plaza
property shall occur as described below.
[Robinson] shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to
[Robinson) taking the following actions.
[Robinson] shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the
Phoenix Plaza and pay [Debra) the amount of $1,784,419 for
2

The $1.9 million amount is derived from the nearly $1.8 million set forth in

116B of the Stipulation set forth below, as well as $105, 777 to be paid for
Ms. Robinson's interest in the parking lot adjacent to the Plaza (117B), and
the $22,500 for Ms. Robinson's interest in a small plane (,I20), which also
were to be paid when the Plaza was refinanced.
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her equity in the Phoenix Plaza property calculated as (i) one
half of the difference between the stipulated fair market value
of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7.25M) less the purchase price
($4.SM), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by [Ms.
Robinson], plus (iii) $12,500 for the earnest money paid by
[Ms. Robinson], plus (iv) one half of the mortgage pay down in
the amount of $67,616 at the time [Robinson] has paid [Ms.
Robinson] for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus
(v) $62,500 for the St. George condominium credit, less (vi)
$234,000 for the Deer Valley condominium credit, less (vii)
$391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. If the re-financing
does not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the
date the parties sign this Agreement, [Robinson] shall pay [Ms.
Robinson] interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) from one
hundred twenty (120) days after the parties sign the Agreement.
[Robinson/ shall file the loan refinance application within 15
days of the date of this Agreement. [Ms. Robinson/ shall assist
[Robinson/ in preparing and filing the loan refinance
application.
The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza until the
time of re-financing occurs. [Ms. Robinson] shall provide the
bookkeeping and accounting services for the Phoenix Plaza and
provide [Robinson] the regular monthly reports.

48. Each party has made a full and fair disclosure to the other of
his or her assets, financial condition and worth, and each party
has had the opportunity to inspect the other's records as they
relate to the subject matter hereof and is satisfied by the
disclosures of the other party and knowingly and willingly
waives any further disclosures.
50. The parties represent that prior to the execution of this
Agreement they have each reviewed and discussed its terms
with their respective counsel, if deemed necessary, and that the
same represents a fair and equitable distribution of the assets
acquired and liabilities incurred by the parties.
54. Each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate
the refinancing of the existing mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza
18

property and shall cooperate and provide necessary
documentation and signatures on a timely basis.
(Emphasis added.) See Complaint (R. 1-34) at, 26 and Answer (R. 164f

176) and Amended Answer (R. 193-206), and see Stipulation, Exhibit 1 to
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
301-496), Appendix Ex. 3.
11. Contrary to Clark's specific instructions to Bean, Bean did not
ensure that the Stipulation had provisions which made the Stipulation
contingent upon Robinson's ability to refinance the Plaza. Bean did not
ensure that the Stipulation could be rescinded in the event that Ms.
Robinson's financial representations as to the Plaza were false. See
Stipulation, App. Ex. 3.
12. Robinson commenced exploring different loan options. He was
concerned about interest rates, and he was concerned that Ms. Robinson's
representations were accurate as that had formed the basis of the $7.5
million "stipulated" value of the Plaza, the amount of annual net rents, and
the status of the tenants' leases at the Plaza. See Statement of Facts Nos. 38,
40- 42 below.
13. In connection with any loan application, Robinson would be
required to present financial statements for the Plaza and rent rolls so that
lenders could evaluate the creditworthiness of the Plaza. Ms. Robinson was
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required to provide those financial statements and tenant lease information
to Robinson. Those documents were not received until February 2008. See
Affidavit of Melissa M Bean (R. 688-692, 708-12), copy attached to
Appendix as Exhibit 4, at ~6.
14. Bean, on behalf of Robinson, made repeated requests to
Andreasen for Ms. Robinson to provide the necessary information. See id.
15. After Ms. Robinson had breached the Stipulation by failing to
provide the necessary information, Bean told Robinson that Ms. Robinson
had been the "first to breach," and he therefore did not need to submit a loan
application within the fifteen days set forth in the Stipulation. Despite that,
Robinson continued to explore financing options and continued to press Ms.
Robinson to supply the necessary information as he began having serious
questions as to her representations about the net income for the Plaza and the
status of the leases. See Statement of Facts, Nos. 38, 41, 42 below.
16. Among other things, Robinson learned that several of the
significant leases had expired and that major tenants were not going to
renew the leases. See Statement of Facts Nos. 38, 40- 42 below.
17. Clark's concerns as to how Robinson needed to be protected
turned out to be prophetic. In fact, the Plaza did not qualify for refinancing
because the status of the leases was not as had been represented and failed to
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meet the lenders' requirements that at least 85-90% (depending on the
lender) be occupied by tenants with long term leases. The Plaza never
qualified for refinancing and Robinson could not meet the terms of the
Stipulation. See Appendix Ex. 4, 17; and see Statement of Facts Nos. 38, 4042 below.
18. The Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and Enter
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce arguing that the purposes of the Stipulation
had been frustrated by the impossibility of Robinson being able to secure a
new $3.5 million loan and/or based upon a mutual mistake that the parties
believed the Plaza qualified for refinancing. See Memorandum in Support of

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at (R. 352, 360-361) ("The
proposed stipulation must now be set aside because additional information
[Ms. Robinson] has recently provided makes clear the main condition
precedent to the implementation of the parties' financial settlement [Robinson's] ability to refinance the parties' main asset and thereby buy out
[Ms. Robinson's] interests - cannot be achieved. As a result, the financial
terms of the parties' divorce will have to be renegotiated.").
19. Based upon the parties' affidavits and declarations an~ proffered
testimony, the Commissioner upheld Debra's position, ruling in her favor as
follows:
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[I]n regards to the motions before me, it's my finding that Mr.
Robinson chose freely and voluntarily and with the advice of
counsel and others to enter into the terms of the Agreement. To
the extent that he relied upon Ms. Robinson's handwritten
analysis [purporting to show the status of the leases and the
$7.5 million stipulated value] or any other verbal
representations that she made, Mr. Robinson chose to rely upon
those representations and he chose not to include those
representations in the Settlement Agreement, to make any
reference to them whatsoever, or to include them as preconditions. In essence, I believe what Mr. Robinson is asking
today when he says was the deal fair, is in hindsight. It's very
easy after many months pass to determine whether or not a deal
at the time, met the expectations of each of the parties.
Apparently, they didn't meet Mr. Robinson's. But at the time,
it's clear to me that the deal was reached in fair fashion, and it
represented the parties' agreement at the time and Mr.
Robinson did not do what he specifically agreed to do to initiate
the refinance process ....

See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
...

Judgment, at (R. 312-313, 365-70).
20. Robinson objected to the Commissioner's recommendations and
asked for an evidentiary hearing to present evidence to the Hon. Glenn
Iwasaki that the terms of the Stipulation were impossible to meet given the
inability to refinance the Plaza, that it should be rescinded due to mutual
mistake, and that the refinancing of the Plaza was the central component of
the parties' Stipulation upon which title transfers to nearly all the assets were
contingent. See docket entries contained in (R. 446) and Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at (R. 353).
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21. Judge Iwasaki overruled Robinson's objections, and on December

31, 2008, entered the Findings of Pacts and Conclusions of Law and the
Decree of Divorce, which incorporated the provisions of the Stipulation
verbatim. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, at (R. 353, 372-74, 376-89).
22. After that ruling, an appeal was taken of the divorce court's ruling.

See id. at (R. 391-93).
23. On April 22, 2010, this Court issued its opinion, Robinson v.
Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, affirming Judge Iwasaki's decision. In doing
so, it ruled that Robinson was not excused from the terms of the Stipulation
based upon the contractual doctrines of mutual mistake or impossibility. See
id. at (R. 395-401).
24. More specifically, this Court first affirmed that "A party may
rescind a contract when, at the time the contract is made, the parties make a
mutual mistake about a material fact, the existence of which is a basic
assumption of the contract. If the parties harbor only mistaken expectations
as to the course of future events and their assumptions as to facts existing at
the time of the contract are correct, rescission is not proper." Id. at 1 10
(internal citation and quotation omitted). This Court concluded that the
mutual mistake doctrine did not apply because Michael and Debra were only
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mistaken about their expectations as to future events, i.e. the ability to obtain
a loan in the future. Id This Court failed to address Michael's argument that
the mistaken assumption was that the Plaza then-qualified for refinancing at
the time the Stipulation was signed.
25. As to the impossibility defense, the Court acknowledged that
"Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed
discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and
without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the
obligation impossible or highly impracticable." Id. at ,r 12 (internal quotation
and citation omitted). It was held that this defense was unavailable to
Robinson because Robinson alleged "no unforeseen event occurring after the
stipulation was signed in November 2007 that altered the possibility of
performance .... Instead, [Robinson] argues in his brief that at no point could
he have obtained a loan 'given the state of the leases in November 2007,
January 2008, or anytime thereafter."' Id. Thus, with respect to the
impossibility defense, the Court apparently acknowledged that the Plaza did
not qualify for refinancing in November 2007, but quixotically failed to
recognize that thus, at the very least, the same facts supported Robinson's
claim that the parties were mutual mistaken that as of November 2007, the
Plaza was eligible for refinancing.
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26. Upon remand, Ms. Robinson moved to hold Robinson in contempt
for failing to obtain the refinancing loan. Robinson argued to the divorce
court that he could not be held in contempt because it was impossible for
him to perform the terms of the Decree. Ms. Robinson's counsel
successfully argued to the divorce court that this Court's ruling that the
doctrine of impossibility as a contractual defense was res judicata as to
Robinson's defense of inability to perform to avoid a finding of contempt.
Judge Iwasaki's ruling was in error. There was no res judicata because there
were different issues and different burdens of proof.
27. On July 26, 2011, Judge Iwasaki found Robinson in contempt and
entered a contempt judgment against Robinson for over $1.7 million. The
divorce court declined to allow Robinson to present testimony of
commercial loan brokers who were there to testify that the Plaza did not
qualify for a loan in November 2007. See Docket Entries (R. 452). No final
judgment, however, was entered until May 29, 2013. See Docket Entries (R.
480). That matter is now on appeal to this Court.
28. Thereafter the divorce court awarded several awards of fees to Ms.
Robinson, ordered the sale of the properties to satisfy the contempt
judgment, and recently held Robinson in contempt for his inability to pay
fees awarded to Ms. Robinson, which resulted in his spending 25 days in the

25

Salt Lake County jail. The propriety of these contempt orders are now on
appeal to this Court.
29. Robinson has now lost all of his pre-marital assets but for a profit
sharing plan which provides him some monthly income. He has lost his
interests in the Phoenix Plaza, the adjacent parking lot, a St. George
condominium, a strip mall in Sandy, Utah called the Demi Plaza, a Deer
Valley condominium, undeveloped property near Mesquite, Nevada. Income
from the commercial properties had been his primary source of income. He
has now suffered the trauma, as a 66-year old man, of spending 25 days in
county jail as punishment for a financial inability to pay Ms. Robinson
$12,500 in fees even though the divorce court made no finding that he
actually had the ability to pay.
30. It is self-evident that if Bean had complied with Clark's directions,
i.e. had the Stipulation provided that it could be set aside if the Plaza for
some reason could not be refinanced or if Ms. Robinson's representations as
to the financial and tenant information were false, then Robinson would not
have suffered the loss of millions of dollars of assets and income or suffered
the emotional pain and suffering he has endured.
31. Alternatively, if Ms. Robinson would not have agreed to such
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terms, then there would have been no agreement, and the divorce action
would have gone to the divorce court for an equitable distribution of the
parties' assets. The Stipulation itself was consistent with Utah law generally
awarding each party their separate property and then dividing marital assets
on an equal basis. Even if all the parties' assets had been declared marital
property, Robinson would have been millions of dollars better off than
where he is now.
32. The foregoing facts were presented to the lower court in this
malpractice action, with much of the evidence coming from the Defendants'
submissions to the court.

33. Despite that evidence, the court ruled that Defendants' were
entitled to summary judgment.
The Record Before the Court Disclosed Issues of Material Fact.

34. The lower court granted the Defendants summary judgment despite
the pleadings, discovery, and other submissions to the court showing that
issues of material fact were in dispute.
35. For example, the Defendants admitted that on November 1, 2007,
Ms. Bean received an email from Ms. Robinson's counsel, Dean Andreasen,
with a copy of the proposed stipulation that would be discussed during the
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mediation the following day. See Complaint (R. 1-34) at ,r 19 and Answer
(R. 164-176) thereto; and Amended Answer (R. 193-206).
36. The Defendants admitted that Bean provided the draft stipulation
to Clark for his comments. Defendants also admit Clark wrote back "There
probably ought to be some protections in the event [Robinson] is unable
notwithstanding his 'best efforts' to refinance Phoenix Plaza" and that
"Looks good otheiwise I guess, can't tell whether it's a good deal for him or
not, but do your best to protect him against bad things that could happen
down the road, like an unforeseen inability to refinance." See Complaint (R.
1-34) at ,r22 and Answer (R. 164-176) and Amended Answer (R. 193-206).
3 7. Most importantly, the submissions provided to the lower court by
Cf

the Defendants themselves inherently showed that there were disputes of
material facts. The Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Swnmary Judgment (R. 301-496) contained Exhibit 10, Plaintiffs Answers
to Defendants' First Set of Requests for Interrogatories.
38. In Robinson's interrogatory answers, Robinson made the
following responses detailing his claims of malpractice against the
Defendants and the consequences suffered, all of which revealed significant
issues of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment:
a. "Prior to and during the mediation Ms. Bean expressly
told [Robinson] that she would protect [Robinson's] interests.
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[Robinson] also understood that Mr. Clark would properly
protect [Robinson's] interests by supervising Ms. Bean in all
aspects of the divorce." (R. 404).
b. "Within a week of the mediation, Ms. Bean advised
[Robinson] that {Robinson] was 'not required to perform'
because Ms. Robinson refused to provide updated information
in order to assist {Robinson] in the application for refinance.
Ms. Bean advised [Robinson] that Ms. Robinson was first to
breach and that there was 'essentially no agreement. '" (R.
404).
c. "Plaintiff has had to conduct an ongoing defense in the
divorce case which should have been resolved during
Defendants' representation. In addition, Plaintiff had to retain
counsel to prevent Ms. Robinson from attaching bank accounts
and Plaintiffs retirement fund which has reduced Plaintiffs
income. Bur for the proper protections Mr. Clark instructed Ms.
Bean to include in the settlement documents Plaintiffs pension
would not have been targeted by Ms. Robinson. Ms. Robinson
has been unrelenting in her attempts to have Plaintiff found in
contempt for failing to pay the amounts set forth in the
stipulation which Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff to sign. Plaintiff
has had insufficient funds to pay taxes for the years 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012 and is now subject to levies and garnishment by
the State of Utah and by the IRS. Plaintiff has been unable to
keep payments current on his house and the home is in
foreclosure .... These are the ongoing legal problems that are
related to Defendants breaches of duty as more fully set forth in
Plaintiffs complaint." (R. 405-06).
d. "Plaintiff relied upon the advice of the Defendants as
to the best ways to deal with any information provided by Ms.
Robinson, including the 'Handwritten Analysis."' (R. 408).
e. "[As to the witnesses who could testify to the fact that
the Plaza would not qualify for a loan in November 2007] [i]n
addition to John Gottschall mentioned above, Steve Clifford,
mortgage broker at NorthMarq in Denver, advised Plaintiff
regarding the conditions under which a lender would approve a
loan which were that 90% of the rentable space in the Plaza had
to be rented under acceptable, long term leases. Steve Clifford
made it clear that the 90% was mandatory. Plaintiff advised Ms.
Bean of this information ....
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In addition, Mark McMullen, an underwriter at
RiverSource reviewed the lease information and said that his
company could 'not have closed the loan' and said that in order
to be counted as income for the purpose of loan repayment back
in 2007, leases had to have two years remaining .... Eric
Wadley was a vice president of Lehman Brothers commercial
lending. When I could not find financing anywhere else, I
thought that maybe he could help me, as he's married to my
oldest daughter. He reviewed the situation and said that
Lehman Bros. lending underwriting had gotten very strict back
in August 2007, and that his company would not provide a loan
for the Phoenix Plaza." (R. 409).
f. Ms. Bean graduated from law school in 2003. From
2004 to 2006 she was a judicial law clerk at the Supreme Court
of Utah. When Plaintiff retained Defendants, it appears that Ms.
Bean had less than one year of actual experience in private
practice. Jones Waldo and Mr. Clark assigned Plaintiffs multimillion dollar divorce case to Ms. Bean who was then allowed
to face a significantly more experienced opponent .... To
Plaintiffs knowledge, Ms. Bean did not consult with or have
Mr. Clark review the final draft of the agreement before it was
signed. However, Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff to sign the
agreement in spite of the fact that the agreement did not
include the language that would protect Plaintiff 'in the event
he was unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to refinance
Phoenix Plaza' or 'protect him against bad things that could
happen down the road like an unforeseen inability to
refinance.' [referencing the November I, 2007 email attached
as Ex. 1 to the Appendix]." (R. 410-11 ).
g. "After the mediation, Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff that
Ms. Robinson's conduct was the 'first to breach' and so
essentially there was no agreement and therefore Plaintiff was
not required to file the application. Ms. Bean advised that
because of Ms. Robinson's 'first breach' the agreement would
be set aside and would be renegotiated. Ms. Bean repeated this
to Plaintiff over the course of several months and the arguments
made by Defendant in motions and hearings at subsequent
proceedings were based upon the same premise." (R. 411).
h. "Plaintiff contacted River Source Life Insurance
Company, and it supplied a mortgage application. Plaintiff
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obtained as much information as he could to submit the
application. However, Ms. Robinson did not produce the
required YTD income and expense reports requested by Ms.
Bean from Ms. Robinson and her counsel. ... Ms. Bean was not
successful in getting that report until Februrary 22, 2008." (R.
411).
i. Plaintiff also contacted another broker, Steve Clifford
with Northmarq in Denver, Colorado. Mr. Clifford said he had
a lender that was interested in the property, Columbian Mutual
Life Insurance Company, and supplied Plaintiff with an
application. Plaintiff was able to provide him with all the
requested documents in December of 2007, with the exception
of the required YTD income and expense report that Ms.
Robinson and her counsel had refused to provide. Plaintiff sent
Mr. Clifford all the other documents and filled out the
application, but that application, just like the one from River
Source, also required that at least 90% of the Phoenix Plaza be
under long term, valid, not in default, leases acceptable to the
lender. The Phoenix Plaza at the time of the mediation was only
72% under valid long term leases, and by December when
Plaintiff filled out the application for Columbian Mutual
Plaintiff had still not received the necessary information from
Ms. Robinson or her counsel to complete the application." (R.
412).
39. On September 25, 2013, Defendants filed their Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply. (R. 580-696).
Exhibit 7 to the Defendants' Sur-Reply Memorandum contained a series of
emails between Bean and Robinson (R. 650-81). Outside of the November I,
2007 emails containing Clark's instructions to Bean to provide him
protection if the Plaza could not be refinanced, these were the only emails
attached to any submissions to the lower court. The lower court clearly
reviewed and considered these emails as her Ruling, copy attached as
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Exhibit 1 to the Appendix specifically referenced them. Those emails
encouraged Robinson to try to make the loan applications. As shown above,
however, Bean stated under oath, and she knew that the loan applications
required financial information that Ms. Robinson was not providing!
Some of those same emails were suggesting that Robinson make a loan
application in anticipation of being turned down in order to posture the case
and present a stronger legal position to the divorce court. There were clear
conflicts of material facts on this issue.
40. In addition to the conflicts between the Defendants' interpretation
of the Exhibit 7 emails and Bean's Affidavit, the emails themselves tell a
different story. For example, in his 11/29/07 email at (R. 652), Robinson
expressed his concerns but said that "I didn't know the mortgage rates would
be so unstable, and I am working on funding the buyout. I will talk to Debra
and see if she'll be a little flexible on the penalty interest .... I will definitely
need more time to secure and close a mortgage." Later on that same date, he
wrote: "We are working on it, but rates have been doing a bit of a rollercoaster. If I can lock a rate slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making
progress, but I may still need an additional month or two, and I think that's
reasonable." (R. 651). On December 5, 2007, Robinson wrote Bean "I am
shopping rates and have several serious lenders."(R. 658). The emails reveal

32

that the parties were discussing additional mediation and agreement to
suspending the timelines in the Stipulation because of the issues. See emails
at (R. 659-60). In a 12/9/07 email, Bean wrote to Robinson "The stipulation
does require that you both work together to the Plaza refinanced - where are
you on that?" (R. 652) At that time, Ms. Robinson had still not provided the
necessary financial and tenant information that was required for a loan
application. On 12/10/07, Michael advised Bean that "She [Debra] has been
working on negotiating new rents for several tenants, and I will need signed
leases and addendums in order to refinance the Plaza." (R. 667).

41. Defendants' Exhibit 8 (R. 683-92) was Robinson's Answers to
Defendants' First Set of Requests for Admissions. Therein, Robinson stated
under oath:
a. "Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff that she would protect his interests in
the negotiations at the mediation." (R. 684 ).
b. "Even if it was discovered that Ms. Robinson's information was
incorrect, Ms. Bean assured Plaintiff that his interests were
protected because the terms of the document were impossible to
meet and could be cured by additional mediation." (R. 684 ).
c. "Plaintiff admits that he and his attorneys/the Defendants discussed
the need to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza
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Property. However, Plaintiff denies that Defendants 'advised'

him to file the application within the timeframes outlined in the
settlement agreement." (R. 685).
d. As indicated in Ms. Bean's June 13, 2011 affidavit, which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 [Appendix Ex. 4], Ms. Bean made
repeated requests from Ms. Robinson's counsel to provide Plaintiff
with monthly accounting reports, including year-end 2007 reports.
After the mediation, Ms. Robinson failed to provide this additional
information. Ms. Bean also advised Plaintiff that Ms. Robinson's
conduct was the 'first to breach' and therefore Plaintiff was not

required to file the application. Ms. Bean did not receive the this
information until months after the mediation and long after
Plaintiff needed the information to be able to timely pursue
refinance of the Phoenix Plaza Property." (R. 685).
e. "This whole process would have been avoided if Ms. Bean had
followed Mr. Clark's instruction to be sure to include language in
the settlement agreement accounting for the possibility that
Plaintiff could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property." (R. 686).
£ As noted above, the Affidavit of Melissa M. Bean (Appendix Ex.
4) was included in the Defendants' memorandum. (R. 688-92).
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42. The lower court also had conflicting evidence from Robinson's
own submissions. On October 9, 2013, Robinson's counsel filed a Motion in
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Sur Sur Response (R. 697716) in response to the Defendants' motion to file Sur-Reply (R. 580-696).
In his Additional Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding
Extension to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion (R. 714-716),
Robinson testified that:
4. Debra immediately refused to provide me with a YTD
Income and Expense Report, which was necessary for any loan
application to be complete. After Debra's refusal to provide the
required documentation, within four days of the mediation I
called Bean to alert her to that problem and to matters which
the mediation had totally failed to address. Bean told me within
four days that Debra was in breach of the agreement for not
providing the year-to-date (YTD) income and expense report I
had requested as a prelude to refinancing the commercial
property ... .
5.... After assurance from Bean that Debra had
committed the first breach, I was reluctant to spend
approximately $43,000 to apply for a loan, and a further
$40,000 payment at the time of lender commitment, all for an
application I knew would be rejected out of hand without YTD
information .... The Phoenix Plaza never qualified for the
required loan. I relied on Debra's representations, and on
Bean's commitment to protect my interests.
6. After the application deadline had passed and Debra
had not furnished the required YTD I believed that I was not
obligated because of Bean's multiple statements to me
concerning Debra's first breach ....
9. Later applications proved that tenant defaults and
insufficient leased space percentages made any refinance
impossible. The percentage of unleased space was almost three
times greater than a lender would allow, and six times greater
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than the figures Debra provided to our CPA and which we
relied on at the mediation."
43. In the referenced "Exhibit B" to the Additional Supplemental
Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding Extension to Respond to
Summary Judgment Motion (R. 552-562), and included in the Defendants'
own submissions to the lower court (R. 688-92), Bean testified under oath

that:
4. The stipulation required that [Ms. Robinson] would manage
the property until it was refinanced and she would provide
regularly monthly reports and year end reports ....
6. After the stipulation, [Ms. Robinson/ was required to
provide certain financial information to Petitioner that would
allow him to pursue the refinance ofPhoenix Plaza such as
monthly accounting reports, including the year end 2007
reports. I repeatedly requested the information from [Ms.
Robinson 'sf counsel, hut it was not received until February of
2008 - long after [Robinson/ needed the informtltion in able
to timely pursue the refinance of the Phoenix, Plaza and three
months after our mediation.
7. In addition, after the mediation [Robinson] learned that the
occupancy rate was far below what had been represented by
[Ms. Robinson] and far below what he needed to be able to
refinance the property. As confirmation, [Robinson] received a
letter from Columbian Life Insurance Company that his loan
application required a ninety percent occupancy rate and that
the application would need to be returned by January 26, 2008;
yet, the Phoenix Plaza did not have a ninety percent lease
rate ....
9. [Ms. Robinson] was also required to assist [Robinson] with
preparing and filing the loan application for the refinance and
she did not do so ....
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12. We, therefore, moved the Court to set aside the stipulation
because [Ms. Robinson] had provided inaccurate and material
information as to the occupancy of the Phoenix Plaza and failed
to provide necessary financial information to allow [Robinson]
to pursue the refinance. [Ms. Robinson's] failure to provide the
financial information was the first br~ach of the agreement,
although certainly [Robinson's] reliance on inaccurate
information also made the refinance impossible because
according to his lender, the occupancy was so low as to make
the property unstable in the eyes of a lender.
13. I believe that [Ms. Robinson's] actions in providing
information that was not accurate as the value of the asset and
its occupancy violated the standards of good faith and faith [sic]
dealing and her failure to provide monthly and regular
accounting constituted the first breach of the stipulation.
Moreover, because the property did not have the requisite
leases, [Robinson] could not refinance it.
44. These admissions by Bean confirmed that Ms. Robinson was to
have provided the necessary financial information for the loan application;
that Bean considered this a ''first breach" excusing Robinson's performance
[and consistent with what she had verbally told Robinson as to why he did
not need to meet the 15-day deadline for a loan application contained in the
Stipulation; that the Plaza could not qualify for the required $3 .5 million
refinancing loan; and that Ms. Robinson had misrepresented the valu~ of the
Plaza and its occupancy.
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45. Nowhere in the Stipulation can one find any of the protections that
Clark instructed Bean to include that would have prevented exactly what
Bean admitted in her Affidavit took place.
46. To this day, and despite all the cases in which the question has
arisen, no one has ever shown or even contended that the Plaza actually
could ever have been refinanced any time after the execution of the
Stipulation. They have never shown that had Robinson actually submitted a
loan application within fifteen days, with or without the financial and lease
information that he needed to first receive from Ms. Robinson, that any
lender would have given the required loan. It is indisputable that given the
state of the leases at the Plaza as of November 2007 and thereafter, no lender
would have provided the funding required by the Stipulation. The
Defendants' failure to provide for that possibility, even after Clark instructed
Bean to do so has been devastating on Robinson.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court committed at least three significant errors. With
respect to the Defendants' summary judgment motion, the lower court
mistakenly believed that Robinson was required to submit affidavits in
opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The law is
clear, however, that a party need not submit affidavits or other evidence if
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the moving party's own submissions reveal issues of material fact. In this
case, the lower court considered, not just the submissions in connection with
the motion for summary judgment but also clearly referenced other
pleadings and submissions offered by the parties in connection with
Robinson's Rule 56(f) motion. That complete record disclosed significant
issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment.
Second, the lower court mistakenly held that no evidence had been
presented showing causation. There were inherently issues of material fact
on the matter of causation.
Third, the lower court abused its discretion in not granting Robinson
and his new counsel a reasonable period of time under the circumstances in
which to conduct additional discovery and designate its expert witness.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Lower Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment as
There Were Clear Disputes as to Material Facts Based Upon
the Evidence Presented.
Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part: "The judgment sought shall be

rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."
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In analyzing the lower court's summary judgment ruling, several
guiding principles must be kept in mind. First, "[i]t is the declared policy of
this court to zealously protect the right of trial by jury and not to take issues
from them and rule as a matter of law except in clear cases." Webb v. Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp., 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Utah 1959).

Consistent with this overarching policy it is recognized that:
"[b]ecause disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of
a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, including
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson
Brick Co., 780 P .2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See USA Power, LLC v.
Pacificorp, 2010 UT 31,132,235 P.3d 749 ("Even absent a 'complete

conflict of certain facts,' a dispute of 'the understanding, intention and
consequences of those facts" may defeat summary judgment."); Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).

Second, courts must examine the entire record submitted to determine
whether there are any issues of fact. As stated in Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d
585, 586 (Utah 1982):
[Rule 56(c)] itself sets the criteria for judgment: a party may
receive the judgment requested if (a) the pleadings and
affidavits, if any, show no issue as to any material fact, and (b)
the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(e)
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states specifically that a response in opposition to a motion
must be supported by affidavits or other documents only in
order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact for
trial. Where the party opposed to the motion submits no
documents in opposition, the moving party may be granted
summary judgment only 'if appropriate,' that is, if he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
(citing Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982) (emphasis in
original). See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkins, Wright & Miles,
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (Court held that summary

judgment improper where record showed issues of material fact even though
opposing party failed to present any opposing affidavits).
Third, "[t] he trial court must not weigh evidence or assess
credibility." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkins, Wright & Miles,
Chartered, 681 P .2d at 1261.

Fourth, summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases
(including legal malpractice cases):
Unless the question of negligence is free from doubt, the court
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; .... If .... the court is
in doubt whether reasonable men ... might arrive at different
conclusions, then this very doubt determines the question to be
one of fact for the jury and not one of law for the court. Issues
of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to be resolved
by the fact-finder. It is only when the facts are undisputed and
where but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom
that such issues become questions of law.
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FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Utah
1979) (internal citations and quotations omitted). See Ingram v. Salt Lake

City, 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) ("Although summary judgment may on
occasion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is appropriate only in the
most clear-cut case."); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985)
(and cases cited therein) ("Summary judgment should be granted with great
caution in negligence cases."); Webb, 342 P.2d at 110 I.
In this case, Robinson has alleged and evidence exists to prove all the
elements of a malpractice claim. Those elements are: (1) an attorney-client
relationship (which is undisputed in this case), (2) an accompanying breach
of duty inherent in that relationship, (3) which directly results in actual
injury, loss or damages to the client. See Williams v. Barber, 766 P.2d 887,
889 (Utah 1988); Glencore, Ltd v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376,379 (Utah 1998).
With respect to an attorney's standard of care and the question of
whether it has been breached, the court in Jackson v. Barrett, 645 P.2d 613,
(Utah 1982) reversed summary judgment for the defendant in a legal
malpractice case stating:
An attorney is required to possess the legal knowledge and
skills common to members of his profession, and to represent
his client's interests with competence and diligence.
Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. Consequently,
a motion for summary judgment should be denied where the
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evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party would entitle him to
judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of fact exists
where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds
could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the
required standard.
645 P.2d at 615.
It is not always necessary for an expert witness to opine about the
standard of care. See e.g. George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822,829 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1979) (no expert required to establish that failure to meet statute of
limitations constituted malpractice). Compare Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d
348, 352 (Utah1980) ("expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the
standard of care owed to the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment
received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman.
The loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site,
exemplifies this type of treatment").
In this case, Clark was the seasoned senior attorney representing
Robinson in this multi-million dollar divorce. He himself established the
applicable standard of care by giving his instructions to Bean. He clearly and
unequivocally instructed his inexperienced associate to take two actions in
connection with the settlement negotiations. First, and most importantly (as
he emphasized it twice in his email to Bean) - make sure that provisions are
in place that allow Robinson to rescind the Stipulation if for some reason he
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could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza; and second, put in effectual
provisions requiring that representations be warrantied because he
recognized that the proposed stipulation was "not apposite or thorough." A
jury could certainly consider that Bean was negligent by not following what
was undoubtedly reasonable advice from a seasoned attorney. Moreover, it
is self-evident that what Clark instructed was reasonable and prudent where
millions of dollars were at stake, and virtually every aspect of the Stipulation
hinged upon the successful refinance of the Plaza.
The next issue to be decided in a legal malpractice case is one of
causation. This Court has stated: "We previously have distilled the standard
for causation in legal malpractice actions to the following: The client must
show that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of
professional competence and had done the act he failed to do or not done the
act complained about, the client would have benefited." Kilpatrick v. Wiley,

Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (summary
judgment for defendant attorneys reversed).
In this case, Defendants argued that their negligence was not the cause
of the horrific damages suffered by Robinson, and the lower court
apparently agreed. In doing so, however, the court ignored the conflicting
evidence, including from Bean herself, that no loan application could take
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place prior to Ms. Robinson providing the necessary financial and lease
status information. It also ignores the conflicting evidence that Bean
instructed Robinson that he did not need to make a loan application within
the 15 day time period because Ms. Robinson had been the first to breach. If
these facts are proven to the jury, the Defendants should be estopped from
avoiding liability because Robinson made no loan application, when he had
been advised it was unnecessary by Bean.
Thus, in reaching its conclusions, the lower court did exactly what it
was prohibited fr01n doing - it was weighing the conflicting evidence of the
parties. The lower court erred by ignoring the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom which was contained in the Defendants' and
Robinson's submissions.
The Defendants also contended before the lower court that Ms.
Robinson would not have agreed to any provision in the Stipulation which
conditioned it upon the refinancing of the Plaza, citing her deposition
testimony at which Robinson was neither present nor represented. That is a
"red herring" argument. For purposes of causation and damages, the
question is not whether Ms. Robinson would have agreed to those terms. If
Ms. Robinson had not agreed, then there would have been no settlement.
The parties would have proceeded in their divorce action.
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Therein, the divorce court would have had to make several
determinations: "When dividing assets between divorcing spouses, a trial
court must first categorize the parties' assets into marital and separate
property. Generally, each party is entitled to all of that party's separate
property, including its appreciation during the marriage. After the separate
property of each spouse is identified and backed out of the estate, the marital
property is typically awarded so that each spouse receives roughly an equal
share." Thompson v. Thompson, 2009 UT App 101,208 P.3d 539, 541
(internal citations omitted). See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) ("the trial court should first properly categorize the parties'
property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the
other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property." (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
Robinson is entitled to have his day in court to allow the trier-of-fact
to determine his case. It was clear error to have granted the Defendants
summary judgment on this record which disclosed significant issues of
material fact.
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II.

The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Granting
Robinson Additional Time to Take Additional Discovery from
the Defendants and to Allow Him to Designate His Expert
Witness.
On August 16, 2014, Robinson's new counsel moved the Court for

two extensions - one of time to take depositions to secure further testimony
(primarily of the Defendants) and to allow the late-designation of
Robinson's expert witness which was done in September 2014. The lower
court denied this motion clearly based on the length of time that it took
Robinson to retain new counsel.
The motion itself was styled as a Rule 56(f) motion, but could actually
be considered under Rule 56(f) or Rule 6(b) allowing a trial court to extend
time for the performance.
"Rule 56(£) motions opposing a summary judgment motion on the
ground that discovery has not been completed should be granted liberally
unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Energy Mgmt. Servs.,

L.L.C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, ,r10, 110 P.3d 158 (citing Salt Lake
County v. Western Dairymen Coop., Inc., 2002 UT App 39, 124, 48 P.3d
910.
Similarly, in determining whether an expert witness should be allowed
to testify who was not identified within the period designated in the
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scheduling order, in Welsh v. Hosp. Corp., 2010 UT App 171,235 P.3d 791,
this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
plaintiff's expert from trial because he designated the expert later than the
three-times-amended scheduling order provided.
In holding that the trial court abused its discretion, this Court noted
that while a trial court can impose sanctions under Rule 37 for failing to
comply with scheduling orders and exclude expert testimony, "a trial court's
discretion to exclude expert witness testimony is not absolute. Excluding a
witness from testifying is extreme in nature and should be employed only
with caution and restraint." Id. at ,II O(internal quotations and citations
omitted).
This Court further stated that "On occasion, justice and fairness will
require that a court allow a party to designate witnesses, conduct discovery,
or otherwise perform tasks covered by a scheduling order after the courtimposed deadline for doing so has expired. Boice by & through Boice v.
Marble, 1999 UT 29, ,IIO, 982 P.2d 565." Id.

This Court ultimately considered a number of factors and held that "In
sum, the trial court's discretion, while expansive, ... is not unlimited."
Among other things, this Court considered that the subject case was three
years old, the requested extension would not have affected any trial date, and
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most importantly, defendants would have suffered no prejudice by the delay
where the plaintiffs' ability to prove liability an damages could be
devastated by the exclusion of their expert witnesses." See id. at 119.
Finally, in Abrami v. Town ofAmherst, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14843
**3-4, the court considered what constituted "excusable neglect" in the
context of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a summary judgment. Although
applied to a different rule, the reasoning there is equally applicable to this
case:
The "excusable neglect" standard is a flexible one. In Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P 'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct.
1489 (1993), the Court construed the term as permitting late filings
caused not only by "intervening circumstances beyond the party's
control," but also by "inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness." Id. at
388. The excusable-neglect determination "is at bottom an equitable
one, taking account all relevant circumstances, " including "the
danger of prejudice to the [non-moving party], the length of the delay
and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the
delay, including whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 395.
Of these factors, the reason for the delay is the most critical: there still
must be a satisfactory explanation for the late filing.
The Abrami court went on to conclude "Instead, we simply conclude
that plaintiff's summary judgment opposition although tardy, raises enough
question marks to warrant a remand. Under these unusual circumstances,
we think further district court review of the various issues at stake-whether
by a renewed motion for summary judgment or otherwise - would be
appropriate." Id. at *8.
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Applying these principles to this case shows that the lower court
clearly abused its discretion in not granting Robinson the reasonable and
modest extra time he sought. At a critical stage in the proceedings,
Robinson's counsel withdrew from representation after written discovery
had essentially been completed, but before depositions were scheduled to be
taken and expert witnesses designated.
The case itself was being prosecuted as virtually all written discovery
had been issued and timely responded to. When his counsel withdrew,
Robinson immediately sought accommodation from Defendants' counsel to
set back the scheduled dates, but got no positive response. In his ignorance,
he failed to file a request for extension with the court, in part, because he did
not know how long it would take to obtain new counsel. He then diligently
began his quest to secure new counsel.
Understandably, he did not attend the only non-party deposition
scheduled, that of Ms. Robinson, because he was ill-equipped to participate
in such a proceeding. Although the Defendants had noticed Robinson's
deposition, they did not follow up or move to compel his attendance.
Instead, the Defendants understandably pressed their advantage and
moved for summary judgment, more than three and one-half months before
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the scheduled date for submission of dispositive motions, while Robinson
was unrepresented and out-gunned.
When Robinson's new counsel entered their limited appearance, the
date for responding to the motion for summary judgment had ostensibly
expired by only one day. They could not reasonably have been expected to
have been able to respond to the summary judgment on the merits.
New counsel immediately sought an agreement of counsel to postpone
a formal response to the motion for summary judgment until the lower court
had actually ruled that the Defendants' overlength memorandum could be
filed. There was no courtesy extended to new counsel by the Defendants.
Thus, out of precaution, new counsel hastily filed their motion, styled
as a Rule 56(f) motion, asking for only a few more months in which to take
depositions to obtain evidence to respond to the Defendants' summary
judgment motion. A short time later, they also identified the expert witness
that they intended to call on Robinson's behalf.
On this undisputed record, the lower court abused its discretion in not
granting Robinson and his new counsel reasonable time. The reason for the
delay was an intervening circumstance beyond his control - his counsel
unexpectedly withdrew. There is simply no evidence that Robinson was
dilatory in seeking new counsel. His affidavit as to his herculean efforts to
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obtain new counsel was not disputed. He spoke with over twenty different
attorneys including those in nearby states looking for counsel who were not
legally or socially conflicted, who would be willing to review the actions in
a lengthy and complex divorce proceeding, take on some of the most bestknown and largest firms in Utah, and do it all on a contingent fee basis.
The scheduling order in this case was entered on December 28, 2013.

It provided for a very aggressive discovery period of only six months, which
likely would have been met if Robinson's counsel had not withdrawn. As

Welsh demonstrates, it would appear that multiple scheduling orders in a
case are not uncommon. The issues were not even engaged until Defendants
filed their Answer to the Complaint on July 23, 2012. There was no trial date
established, so any short delays would not have impacted the Defendants
ability to try the case.
Once the Scheduling Order was in place, the case was diligently
prosecuted. There were no discovery abuses, no motions to compel, no
contumacious conduct.
There was simply no prejudice to the Defendants if an extension had
been granted. In stark contrast, Robinson was much more likely to be
prejudiced if he was not allowed to take depositions and submit evidence
from his expert.
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Based upon the foregoing, this matter should be remanded for trial,
and the lower court ordered to allow Robinson additional time for discovery
and completion of expert designation and discovery.

CONCLUSION
Nothing Robinson has done warrants the treatment he has received
from the courts in these various proceedings, including the one now before
this Court. The Stipulation could not have been performed because the Plaza
could not have been refinanced given the state of the leases - it simply did
not qualify. Robinson will continue to maintain that the Stipulation should
have been set aside based either upon the contractual doctrines of mutual
mistake that the Plaza qualified for refinancing when the Stipulation was
entered or that it became impossible to perform when the true status of the
leases became known.
Regardless of whether those contractual defenses applied, this
Court's ruling that contractual defenses did not apply, should not have been
considered res judicata as to Ms. Robinson's contempt motion thus
subjecting Robinson to an over $1. 7 million judgment which allowed Ms.
Robinson to "fire sale" his pre-marital and marital property and deprive him
of millions of dollars of assets and income.
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Having been financially ruined, he should not have been subjected to
25 days in jail when he could not pay $13,900 to Ms. Robinson's counsel.
Granted, these other matters go beyond the specific scope of this
appeal, but they are nevertheless relevant because all these results would
have been utterly and completely avoided had the Defendants not committed
malpractice. If Bean had provided the standard of competence and ability
instructed by Clark, either the Stipulation would have been set aside for Ms.
Robinson's misrepresentations or for the inability to refinance the Plaza; or
the parties would simply have continued to trial where the divorce court
would have made an equitable division of the parties' property interests.
The Defendants' malpractice is clear, and the damages suffered as a
consequence of those actions is equally clear. The lower cow1 was presented
with evidence supporting Robinson's claims, and it improperly disregarded
that evidence in granting Defendants summary judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Robinson respectfully submits that the
lower court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed as obvious
issues of material fact existed even on the somewhat limited record before
her. In addition, the lower court abused its discretion in not granting
Robinson the limited additional time requested. The lower court should be
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ordered, under the circumstances of this case, to allow Robinson an
additional period in which to conduct discovery after he secures new counsel
and to designate his expert witness.
DATED this

2

day of October, 2014.

"'
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10. Plaintiff claims he never received the motion.
11. On August 12, 2013, plaintiffretained present counsel to represent him on a limited basis

to request more time for discovery and to respond to the motion for summary judgment
12.

011

August 16, 2013, plaintiff filed a l'equest for extension of time for discovery and to

respond to the motion for summary j1.1dgmei1t.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. While pro se litigants sho~d be accorded every consideration that may reasonable be

indulged, they are bound to follow the rules of civil procedure just as counsel are.
2. Plaintiff was required to follow the discovery plan and scheduling order to designate

expert wifl?aesses by July 26, 2013. . · . . . . ... '.
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Without an expert witness, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that defendant~., tepresentation of him in his
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divqrce action fell. below the applicable ,standard of care. AdditionaIIy;__ the ai-Cfidavits, emails, and
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stipulation to resolve his divorce after long negotiations between him ~nd his ex-wife personally.
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accountant. He clearly wanted to retain ownership of the Phoenix Plaza ~nd accepted the stipulation:
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arrived at on Friday November 2, 2007, without taking even a weekend to think it over. After the
weekend he had second thoughts and tried to get his attorneys to "stop" the agreement. By then it
was too late; he had signed the agreement and was bound by it The emails between plaintiff and
defendants demonstrate that they tried to come up with theories through which he could be relieved
of his responsibility to refinance but told him that the chances were 50/50 at best. Defendants'
emails to plaintiff continually reminded him of his obligation to refinance the Plaza within 15 days

but also show that he continually put offthat obligation hoping to get a better interest rate and hoping

to have to pay the application fee for refinancing.

not

Based upon his failure to even attempt to

comply with the stipulation, this· Court and other courts have ruled against him in other cases.
Plaintiff cannot show that any actions by defendants have caused the fi¥ancial losses he i$ facing.
•
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As other cpurts h~ve held) his, failure to even attempt to comply with th~ stipulation have been the

caqse of bis losses.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 110415662 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL:

KEITH A C.~L 10 EXCHANGE PLACE STE 1100 POB 45000 SALT

CITY, UT 84145-5000
lV'.iAIL:
CHASE KIMBALL 8 E BRDWAY STE 41.0 SALT

LAKE CITY

LAKE

UT 84111

/s/ PAMELA WILKINS

02/12/2014
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2

EMAIL FROM STEPHEN CLARK
TO
MELISSA BEAN
dated November I, 2007 5:29 p.m.

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2

'

,

'

... :

From: Stephen Clark
.
Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2007 5:29 PM
To: Melissa Bean
subject: RE: Robinson Mediation

The languages In paras 13 and 14 Is a little unclear to me. Fcrst, why are they here awarded "the parties' lnteresF

11/6/2007
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In the respective properties "subject to" assuming and paying any debt, instead of the same language as prior
paragraphs simply awarding the property (not the parties interests therein) and stating the party awarded the
property "shall assume and pay' the associated debt? The difference in language suggests a difference in intent,
and I'm not sure there Js one. Second, 1assume the obligation to assume and pay the debt on the condos is
wholly separate from the provision that allows rental income from Phoenix Plaza to be used to pay the "costs and
expenses• - I.e., I assume "costs and expenses" do not include the mortgage - but that could perhaps be a bit
more clear.
·re nance oen
aza. At a minimum there should be a cap on the interest under 16.B. ff for some reason he
can't refinance within ttie next year, he ends up owing her 20% intersest, and It Just keeps climbing? Hls fncent1ve
to refl Is captured in the already--hlgh 10% rate, so rm not sure why he would agree to tack on an additional
amount every month, but at a minimum there needs to be a cap or some kind of out lf for some reason he can't
refinance.

Also consider an attomeys' fees provision awarding fees to the prevailing party in the event action is Initiated
relating to the agreement.
Looks good otherwise I guess~ can't tell whether 1rs a good deal for him or not, .but do your best
against bad things that could happen down the road, like an unforeseen- inabUlty ~. refinance.

to pmtect him
.· ·

.

;·

s

From: Melissa Bean
Sent: Thursday, NQvember 01, 2007 4:35 PM
To: Stephen Oark
·
subject: FW: Robinson Mediation
J

'

'

I don't suppose you have time to take a Jook at this? The mediation is tomorrow; I suppHed Karin with a mediation
statement and we'll be using the attached above as a template. M

From: Dean c. Andreasen [mallto:DCA@Clyde5now.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2007 4:28 PM
To: debrajrobinson@hotmafJ.com; Melissa Bean; karln@hobbsmedlatfon.com
Subject: Robinson Mediation

j

Melissa and Karin-

I

11/6/2007
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3

STIPULATION
AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
dated November 2, 2007

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3

,

'

DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) .
CLYOE SNOW SESSIONS & SW~NSON
One Utah C~l)ter, Thirteenth Floor '.
201 South Main Street

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
relephone (801) 322-2516

Attornnvs for Respondent
II
I

...:a..:......... - ..

IN THE THIRD JUOJCIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

I

I

STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,

Petitioner,
v.

...,...•·

.

•·

DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Respondent.

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Civil No. 07490.0501
Judge Glenn K lwasalci

Comm. Michael S. Evans

i

The parties make the following stipulations and agreements for the purpose of
settlement of this action and respectfully move the Court to adopt the stipulations an~

agreeme.nts in the final Decree of Divorce to be entered herein.
DIVORCE

1.

The parties shan proceed to obtain a Decree of Divorce granting each a

divorce from the other as provided for by law dJssoMng the marriage of the parties.
I

2.

The parties consent that a Decree of Divorce may be entered with tenns;
!

consistent to the tenns of this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement {thej
l

uAgreemenf').
3.

Petitioner Is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State otl
I

Utah, and has been for more than three months priorto the commencement of this action. !
i

. Jv(·t•••

l° ♦ l'L

h-1~ ~

ddff'tlrc> · z

4.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, respectively, having beeri

married on October 4, 1902.
5.

Oisagreerrients have ensued between the parties concerning theirmarriag~
i

nnd their future .together: meaningful communication between the parties has ceaseq;
.

'

notwithstanding attempts by the parties to reconcile and resolve their differences, the sam~
'
have been to no avail and have become irreconcilable making continuation of the marriage

under the circumstances impossible.

l

CHILDREN

\

6.

The parties have no children born as issue of their marriage

and none a~

.

i
;

!

i

expected.

ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS

7.

\

Each party irrevocably waives any claim to past, present or future alimony

under any circumstance or condition.
8.

Each party shall be responsible to maintain his or her own medical and dental

and dental costs.
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION
Prior to and during their marriage, the parties acquired certain real aC1fi

personal propertywhich shall be divided between the parties as described below. Priorto

and during the marriage, the parties incurred certain debts and obligations which shall be
'
allocated between the parties as described below. The party assuming a particular de~
;

or obligation shall Indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom.
10.

l
I

insurance coverage and each shall be responsible for ms or her own uninsured medical

9.

\

Petitioner shall be awarded the Seven Springs residence and shalJ assum~

and pay any debt encumbering the property.

2

11.

Respondent shaH be awarded the ten acre parcel in Scenlc, Arizona and shall!

assume and pay any debt encumbering the property.
.

12.

Respondentshall be awarded 1he Mayan Palace timeshare and shall ~ufne;
,

I

and pay any debt encumbering the property.

,

13.

Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' Interest In the condominium in St. :

George, subject to Petitioner assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property. ;

Petitioner may continue to own and rent the condominium or, afrematively. sell It

but/
I

Petitioner shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Respondent shall be given a credit as!
described below in the amount of $62,500 for her equity in 1he condominium ca1culated asj

one half of the difference between the fa1r market value of1he condominium ($250,000):
less 1he airrent mortgage ($125,000). Rental income from the .Phoenix Plaza property1
:

shall~ used to pay au condominium costs and expenses Including Pm ~ such ~e as!

Petitioner has pafd Respondentforherinterestin1he Phoenix Pfazapropertyas described!

below.
14.

Respondent shall be awarded the parties' interest tn 1he oondominium inj

Deer Valley, subject to Respond~ assuming and paying any debt encumbering

I

the!

property. Respondent may continue to own and rent1he condominium or, alternatively, seH!
it but Respondent shall be responsible for aH costs of sale. Petitfoner ~ be_given aj
•

I

credit as described beJow in ·tt1e amount of $234,000 for his equity In 1he condomlniumj
calculated as (i) one half of the difference between 1he fair market value of

the/

ress the purchase price ($515,000}, plus (ii) $27,870 for

thei!

condominium ($900,000}

down payment paid by Petitioner, plus {Iii) $7,500forthe earnest money paid by_Petitioner,/

plus (iv) one half of the mortgage pay down In the amount of $6. 130. at the time ?etitfonerl
'

.

.

has paid Respondent for her interest in 1he Phoenix Plaza property. Rental Income

frornj

the Phoenix Plaza property shali be used 1D pay aft condominium costs and expenses/
3

. ·------.. -
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inclutiing PIT! until such time 3S Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in 1hb
I
Phoenix Plaza property as described below. Rental income• shall be recognized as lncom~
I
when earned, not dep0sited. Cash from rental income When earned shall be

equall1

divided until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her Interest in the Phoen~

''

Plaza property as described below. .

15.

''

.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the retail center in Sandy shall occ~r
;

i
i

as described below.
A

;'

I

l·

r

The retail center shall be imme&ately listed for sale. The parties srnill
!

I

agree to the listing agent. the listing price, any r~duction in the listing price, and th;e
I

ultimate terms of sale. In lieu of Petitioner receiving cash from the sale, Petltion~r

.\

shall be given a credit in the amount of $391,000 ($32,188 + $358.812) fof h~
I

interest in the retail center. This credit reflects and assumes estimated net sal!¥1
proceed~ in the amount of $749,812 of which Petitioner shaU receive $391,000

\
I

'

and
I

Respondent shall receive $358,812. If the net S3les proceeds are greater'tha,~
'
$749,812. Respondent shaU pay Pootloner one half of the difference between t~e
!

actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. If the net sales proceeds are less th~n
j

$749,812, Petitioner shall pay Respondent one half of the difference between th~

'
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812.

8.

The parties shaU jointly mange the retafl center until it is

so11.

Respondent s.hall provide the bookkeeping and accounting servlces for the ret~il
i

center and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. The 2007 real property

taxes shall be paid from the joint funds of tt,e parties. Any CAM revenue shall b~

!

equally divided between the parties.
C.

+
I

Until such time as the retail center Is sold. the parties may agree

equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from 1:he net rent.ii

'

4

_,

. ..:.-.....--..

-·~- ··

·,

he time the retail center is sold, each part,' shall be awarded one half
inr.nme. At t
of ;1ny c:a~h from the net rental income.

o.

·

The parties shall agree as to whether any legal action shall be taken

in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party shall
pay one half of any costs Incurred and shall be awarded one half of any monies
recovered.

16.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix Plaza property shall

occur ns described below.

A. .

.. ... ........ _.... . _............ . ..... ··- ···-··· __ ..... -·-··-··- _____ _

Petitioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petitioner

taking the following actions.

B.

Petitioner shall re-flnance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix

Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity fn the Phoenix
Plaza property calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the stfpufated fair
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7.26M) less the purchase price
($4.5M), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by Respondent, plus (iii}

$12,500 for the earnest money paid by ResPondent, plus (IV) -one half of

ffie

mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,618 at the time Petitioner has paid
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v) $62,500 for the

st. George condominium credit, less (vi) $234,000 fortheDeerValley condominium
credit, less (vii~ $391,000 for the Sandy retall center credit. If the re-financing does
not occur within one hundred twenty ( 120) days of the date the parties sign this
Agreement, Petitioner shau·pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percent
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days atterthe parties sign this Agreement.
Petitioner shall file the loan refinance applfcation Within 15 days of the date of this

5

.

'

\

\
·1ncnrne. At tho time the ret::iil center is sold, each pa"''
, ,, shall be awarded one hal
of :-iny c:ash· from the net rental income.

o.

\

·

The parties shoU agree as to whether any legal action shall be take!

in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party~~
pay one half of any costs incurred and shall be awarded one half of any

momel

recovered.
16d
.

~beeddibsposition of the parties' Interest in the Phoenix Pl~ pm.pe~
e1ow.

occur as escn
A.

-~-h~1. .

r.

\
.

\

Petltioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petition]

taking the foUowing actions.
B.

Petitioner shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenr

Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Phoen~

fair
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7.25M) less the µurchase pric4
Plaza property calculated as (I) one half of the dlfference between the stipulated

{iii
$12,500 for the earnest money pald by Respondent, plus (IV) -one half of th1

($4.5M), plus (ii) $891 ,803 for the down payment. paid by Respondent, plus

mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,618 at the time Petitioner has pa~
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v} $62,500 for th

St. George condominium credit, less {vi)$234,000 forthe DeerValleycondominiu
credit, less (vii),$391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. tf the re-financing do
not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the parties sign thi
Agreement, Petitioner shatt· pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percen
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days after the parties sign this Agreement
Petitioner shall me the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of th·

5

·--- -- - ·---- -

1

\

I

·,
l

I

\
Agreement. Respondent shall assist Petitioner in preparing and filing

the loa

refinance application.

c.

The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza unffl the time th

\I

re-financing occurs, Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounti
services for the Phoenix Plaza and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports

o.

Until Respondent is paid her equrty in the Phoenix Plaza, (1) the ne

rental income shall be used to pay, as necessary, the operating costs of th
Phoenix Plaza and the other properties as described above and (2) the parties m

1I .
'

agree to equaJJy distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the ne
rental Income. At the time Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, ea

party shall be awarded one half of any cash from the net rental income.
E.

Tenants of the Phoenix Plaza owe certain common area malntenan

fees ("CAM Feestt) for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Any CAM Fees collecie
relative to time periods prior to the time Petitioner re-finances the mortgage on th
Phoenix Plaza shall be equally divided b_
etween tha part\es. Toe parties shall agre
to any colfectfon costs including attorney fees to be incurred In an attempt to col

Each party shall pay one half of all costs and expenses including an

prepayment penalty associated with the payoff of any existing mortgage or encumbran
orthe origination of any new mortgage or encumbrance relative to the re--flr:rancing ofth
Phoenix Plaza debt.
17.

The disposition of the parties' interest mthe parking lot parcel next to

Phoenix Plaza shall occur as described below.

A.

\

I

the CAM Fees.
F.

\

Petitioner shall be awarded the parking lot property subject to

Petitioner taking the following actions.

6

l

B.

/\t the time of ond as a part of the re-financing relative to the mortgag ~

encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, Petitioner shall pay Respo,ndent the amount o,

\

$105.777 which is equal to one half of the difference between (1) ~25,000
I

(representing the stipulated fair market value of the parking lot parcel) less (2)

th '.

I

unpaid principal amount of the mortgage in lhe amount of $213,446 on the paridn :
lot pare~! nt the time of the re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. Th '.
amount may be adjusted as required by each party paying one haff of the amou .

f

to -settle or otherwise resolve the disputed claim·of Kcit.h ·Funk·.for rertaln ·sspha : ···

I
I.

services provided relative to the parking lot parcel.

In the event the amou '

necessary to resolve the disputed claim of Kerth Funk has not been determined

b:

the time of the re-financing occurs, such amount shall not be taken
consideration and each party shall thereafter pay one half of the amount

.

l·

~I

Petitioner shall be awarded the Ford Excursion vehicle and the B

motorcycle. Petitioner shall assume and pay the dehl eooumbertng the Ford Excursio :
vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the BMW motorcycle.
19.
vehicles.

Respondent shaU be awarded the Chevrolet Avalanche and Toyota Ma
Respondent shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Chevrol ·
I

Avalanche vehicle. There·is no debt encumbering the Toyota Matrix vehfcie.
20.

I
\

nece

to resolve the disputed claim.
18.

l

Petitioner shall be awarded the Cessna 210 airplane. There is no de :

encumbering the airplane. O,:i the first closing to occur of either the sale of th~ Sandyreta~
center or the refinancing of the Phoenix. Plaza property, Pentloner shall pay Respond en.
!

$22,500 from his share of the net sales proceeds in consideration of Petitioner bein~
'

awarded the airplane.

7

21.

Respondent shall be awarded the aluminum boat and motor. The lntere: t

of the parties in the sailboat shalt be awarded to Matthew Larson.
22.

t

Petitioner shall be awarded his retirement accounts in the Cardiomed PrQ
'

Sharing Plan. Petitioner represents that no contributions have been made to his accou: t
•

!

in the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan during the tenn of the marriage. Petitioner shall ·
awarded his IRA accounts.
23.

shall be awarded her .IRA accounts.
24.

t

Respondent shall be awarded her401(k)retirementaccounts. Respond~

--· . --·· . -- ·· ... ., ·- . .
'
Each party shall be awarded one half of any Utah E~ucatlon Savings Pl~
-··

-· . -

... - .. .. ···--· .

accounts in either parties' name.
25.

Any bank account maintained jointly by the parties for their personal use , r

ti
I

used in conjunction with a real property shall be equally divided between the parties at

time the account Is closed, the property ls sold, or Respondent ls paid out her equity in~
property.

Petitioner shalt be awarded the Rawkin Horse bank account and the cash :1

Petitioner's possession.
26.

Each party shall be awarded his or her indMdual checking and savin ' s

accounts.

27.

The parties have no life Insurance policy that has a cash surrencfer valu~

28.

Each party shall be award~ hfs or her cloth Ing, jewelry, sporting equipme '. ,
[
i

musical instruments, and personal effects.
29.

Each party shall be awarded as his or her separate property, prope '

acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, devise orlnheritance, or as a

gl

from the other party during the marriage
30.

Pelliloner shall be awarded the furniture, furnishings and other person' I

property located in the real properties awarded to him except as described in Exhibit !

8

.

.. ,...,

...t.o.-.- .. _ ..

·•

--~

,._ .-

-

- - : _ •-

.

I '

'I

•

1

1'

:1ttached, which items shall be awarded to Respondent Respondent shall be awarded~

furniture. fumishlngs and other personal property located in the real properties award ;
to her except as described in Exhibit B attached, which items shall be awarded ~

.

.

Petitioner. Respondent may store her personal prop~ at the Seven Springs residen4
unbl thirty days after the date trns Agreement ls signed by the parties. The parties sh ; I
clearly identify in a list the property that is being stored. Respondent may store her

gra1

piano at the. Seven Springs residence for an Indefinite period of time provided

;

rro;

Respondent-shall remove -the .grand piano within 60 days of demand for such

Petitioner.
31.

This paragraph is jntentJonally deleted from this Agreement

32.

Each party shall be awarded one half of any marital property not specfficaf

l

provtded for in this Agreement.

Each party shall assume and pay one half of any marital debt or obllg~

33.

!

not specificaJJy provided for in this.Agreement.

34. . Each party shall assume and pay his or her debts and obTrgations Jn
!

since the time of the separation of the parties. and indemnJfy and hold the other pa:
hannless therefrom.

TAX PROVISIONS
In the event any income tax retum of the parties filed on a married fifing jo t

35.

I

basis is audited, the parties shall be equally liable for any tax, penalty or interest assess

I

or shaU be equally entitled to any refund. The parties shall equally pay one half of t 1
.

excise sales and lodging taxe~ due to the State of Utah relative to the rental of the o

i

I

1

Valley condominium.
The parties shall fUe federal and state income tax retums on a married fifi

36.

Joint basis for the year 2007. Each party shall be awarded one ha.If of any refund or ea :
!

9

. ,.

~-

,., '

)v\)

pmty sh,lll pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 2007 returns wi~ ~

HXception that the incremental taxes owed relative to retirement distributions taken ~
•

I

Petitioner <luring 2007 shall be paid solely by Petitioner from his separate funds.

Ea1

party :;ha II be .:iwarded one halfof any alternative minimum tax credit carryforward from~

2007 federal income tax return.

f

l
l

!

!i
l

Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Seven Sp · · s
i
residence nccrui119 from January 1. 2008. Respondent shall be entitled to any
l
deduction relative to the Scenic.Arizona property or the Mayan Palace timeshare accrulljl
3 7.

t;

.

. --

.

·-·-·-·· --· --~---·-·····. .. .. ····-· l ·····

)

.1 .

·I

I

!

\
t

from January 1, 2008.

I

l-

St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent Is. paid her equity In ~
t:

}

38.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to

Phoenix Plaza property.
39.

:l

Each party shall report one half of any net Income or net loss relative to

I

Sandy retaU center from January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. Respondent shall elect
either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter
transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis
Petitioner a
41.

Jn

into

a § 1031 exchanJ
i
the property by granti '

qredtt for his int~rest.
Each party shall report one hatf of any net income or net loss relative to

Phoenix Plaza property frofJl January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in
property.

42.

Each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one half of any quarte

installment payment made for federal or state income taxes prior to Pe~ner re-financl

10

.·.r'l-~•-·. ti..~·-··· -

.I
'
·,,·

[?eer Valley condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity In~

40.

i

I

Each party shall report one half of any net income o_r net loss relative to

Phoenix Plaza property.

1

.

.,
l

i

'

i

p,1rty sh:lll pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 2007 returns wi~ th

i

fJXception that the incremental ~axes owed relative to retirement distributions taken b;
Petitioner during 2007 shall be paid solely by Petitioner from his separate funds. Eaci

pc1 rty :;half be awarded one ~alf of any alternative minimum tax credit carryforward from th!

\

\

l.,
.l

'I
I
I

2007 federal income tax return.
37.

l

i

I
I

Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Seven SprillQ

residence accrui119 from January 1. 2008.

t:

Respondent shall be entitled to any

deduction relative to the Scenic. Arizona property-or the Mayan Palace.timeshare accrufni
from January 1, 2008.
38.

]

!

St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is. paid her equity in

·1

Phoenix Plaza property.

39.

t

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss re1atfve to tH

1

!
!
i

f

Each party shall report one half of any net income ~r net loss relative tot~

I

qeer Valley condominium from January 1, 2008 unbl Respondent is paid her equity in ttj
Phoenix Plaza property_

40.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to_~

Sandy retail centerfrom January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. Respondent shall elect '.
i
either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter into a § 1031 exchang
!
transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis in the property by granti~
i

Petitioner a credit
for his interest.
'
.

;

Each party shall report one hatf of any net income or net loss relative to th
!
Phoenix Plaza property
January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in
41 .

from

tr(

property.

I

:

42.

Each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one half of any quarte1

installment payment made for federal or state income taxes prior to ~ n e r re-financln'

10
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1

,: \ ! \
)

l .

I,

\
\
l

I

(he mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and paying Respondent her equity in th~
'
property as described above.

1

Petitioner shall be liable for any income tax or penalty relative to distribution~

1

43.

he has taken from his retirement during 2007 at the parties' highest marginal tax rate.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
44.

The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transf~

~
l
)

. i.

..

the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
45_

Each party shall.pay his or he, attorney fees and costs lndivldualiy incurred

Respondent

may have her previous surname of Johnson restored to her·:

she so desires.
47.

A restraining order shall be entered enjoining each party from harassing;

rJnnoying or bothering the other party or any family member of the other party.
48. Each party has made a full and fair disclosure to the other of his or her assets(
!

financial condition and worth, and each party has had the opportunity to inspect the other '

!

records as they relate to the subject matter hereof and is satisfied by the dlsciosures ofth !
I

other party and knowingly and wiilfngly waives any further disclosures.
49.

The parties also represent that they have made no assignment, transfer, o;

distributlon of any funds or property to any third party except in the course of typicaf a
reasonable f1Ving and business expenses.
50.

'

\
l

in this action.

46.

l

The parties represent that prior to the execution ofthis Agreement they hav ·

each reviewed and discussed its tenns with their respective counsel, if deemed necessary

and that the same represents a fair and equitable distribution of the assets acquired an:
liabllities incurred by the parties.

11

·-..-~...

~

i

'!

i

~

l

i
iI

51.

I

In the nvent of a dispute between the parties as to the interpretation of ate

I

of this Agreement, the parties shall mediate the issue before either party may initiate co

',

Gction. Each party stmll pay one half of the mediator's fee.

52.

The file in this action shall be classified as private.

53.

The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of this Agreement shal

be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and costs.

54.

.

Each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate the refinancing of th

1

exisJing m.ortga.ge on, the..Fnoel)iX _Pl~za property

at1d

sh?ll

CO(?.~te

..

II

~,:id_ P.rovid

\:

n~essary documentation and sign~tures on a timely basis.

I

55.

I

Until the refinancing of the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property occurs

1·
the parties shall maintain the status quo on the payment of their expenses and the

II

of funds.

i
'

r

1

\I~
I

i

\·

f
I
I

!

iI
I
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STATE OF UTAH

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

On the

..i.aJ.L day of Jl.~v,m At~

2007, personally appeared before m

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, being duly swam under oath says that he is the signer off

foregoing instrument.

My Commission Expires:

!

I
1·

I

'I

ij
!

iI

13

·1
\·
I

\
I

;,

. r,d . , . ,

\

. •

1
-1:__ day of J_ pu.:u
&[2007.

DATED this

I
1,

(·

\-

I

STATE OF UTAH

\I

)

: ss.

\

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

A; .
On the ~ day of.;,,-.,,,,£✓,,

i

2007, personally appeared before me DEB

I

J :. RO~INSON, being duly sworn under oath says that she is the signer of the forego!

\

Instrument.

l1

l,

I

Residing at._ _ _ _ _ __

L

I
\

i
l,
j
r
I

I

I
\
i

14

..
• ·

...,_.•_

. ,

I ' # CO-• ·

1

. •··

·~·~-

,

.

EXHIBlT A
ITEMS DEjfflA W.AfitS FRQM SANDY RESIDENCE

.....

L

fompurpedic Bed

2:

Marble- Buddha

3.

Washer·& Dryer

4•

Stainte~s Steel Barbeque

5.

New Chase Lounges and Umbrella around pool

-6.
7-.-

;,

I

}-/

1

•

/(, I 'r, :r,...~.,.

• Flat-SQ'effl-ll'i-bed1oom :t 1-Ui'b;r.v-

·

Jt~ tt1,./_-

~ - ~ ~ a n d i g in downstairs family room
... ~ 1-\htt~~ ~~

/tt/l---

8.

Treadmill

9.

Purchases during travel equally dMded

10.

Photographs divided or. copte.d -cost divided equally.

11.

Equally divide sheet music

12.

Freezer in garage

;,

I;
j.

)

\
I

I

-

tI,
}

..,...

t

~-

\

I

~
I

\

.i

.

__

....

...

}(
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 4

AFFIDAVIT OF MELISSA M. BEAN
Dated June 13, 2011
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